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Samuli Schielke, Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient
ميحرلا  نمحرلا  هللا  مسب
In the name of the All-Merciful God
In most Muslim-majority contexts in the world, 
this pious formula is the customary way to begin 
a speech, a work, or a transaction. This is so also 
in Egypt, which I know better than other contexts. 
But in the world of academia (including parts of 
the Egyptian scene),1 speaking and writing in the 
name of God can be seen as odd. Although many 
academics do have a relation of faith with the mon-
otheist God of the Qur’an, He appears out of place 
in an academic text.
Islam without the subject of human submission 
and worship, the One God, makes as little sense as 
Christianity without Christ the Son of God. There 
is no doubt that anthropologists and other social 
scientists are fully aware of the God-centredness 
of Muslim faith and lives. And yet a quick glance 
at recent articles, books, conferences and fund-
ed projects shows a clear prevalence of »Islam« 
and »Muslim« and the relative rarity of »God« or 
»Allah« (the Arabic name of the One God) as key-
1 In fact, my experience of teaching and publishing in 
Arabic in Egypt has influenced my reasoning in this article. 
Some lectures are opened in the name of God, others are 
not, and the lines of division are complex and sometimes un-
predictable. At least in some protected intellectual spaces, 
the incommensurability of different ways of reasoning is a 
productive friction rather than a fundamental obstacle. In 
a study circle I taught from 2014 to 2017 at the Alexandria 
Library, people with secularist and Islamist-leaning theo-
ries and commitments could fit not only into one lecture 
room but also around one coffeehouse table afterwards. 
The dividing lines that were more difficult to cross were 
those between supporters and opponents of the regime, and 
also those between attempts to understand social dynamics 
in their own right on the one hand, and a developmentalist 
epistemology of dividing the social world into negative and 
positive aspects on the other.
words.2 The ethnographic works that I have con-
sulted (see footnote 1) show that their authors are 
well aware of the role of God in the lives of the 
people they converse with and write about. God is 
present in ethnographies conducted among Mus-
lims, but until recently has not been the focus of 
anthropological debates and theories about Islam 
or those about the lives of Muslims. This absence 
is the more striking since other disciplines such as 
theologies, religious studies, and intellectual his-
tory do not have a comparable blind spot regard-
ing the divine. A similar absence or marginality 
has been noted by Jon Bialecki (2014) in anthro-
pologies of Christianity, although God became a 
topic of enquiry earlier in that field. More recently, 
the One God of the Qur’an has become the sub-
ject of more systematic reflections by anthropolo-
gists. I return to these reflections below, but first 
we need to ask why it is that God, so central to 
monotheist faiths and so present in ethno graphic 
encounters, has until recently been so difficult to 
2 I have checked the indexes of thirteen English-language 
anthropological monographs that address Muslim faiths 
and lives, and have been influential for my work. Eight 
(Abu-Lughod 2013, Agrama 2012, Asad 2003, Deeb 2006, 
Gilsenan 1982, Hafez 2011, Hirschkind 2006 and Marsden 
2005) do not have »God« or Allah as index entries. Only Bow-
en 1993, Ghannam 2013, Khan 2012, and Mittermaier 2011 
do feature »God« as index entry. Mahmood 2005 features 
»Fear of God«. In contrast, »Foucault« or »Foucault, Michel« 
is indexed in nine books – only Abu-Lughod 2013, Gilsenan 
1982, Khan 2012 and Marsden 2005 do not have him in the 
index. In a recent critical review of the anthropology of Is-
lam and everyday life (Fadil and Fernando 2015), the words 
»Muslim« and »Muslims« appear 124 times, including the 
title and references. »Islam« appears 148 times, including 
the references. »God« only appears 7 times, and only in cita-
tions from texts by others. In comparison, introductions and 
textbooks on the anthropology of Islam feature better: All 
three that I consulted index either »Allah« (Marranci 2008; 
Kreinath 2012) or »God« (Bowen 2012) as keywords.
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include more systematically in anthropological 
theories. I do not mean metaphysical speculation 
or theological arguments about the existence, 
nature and essence of God. I am also hesitant 
to claim a phenomenological knowledge of other 
people’s knowledge of God. Rather, I am referring 
to the quite tangible acts and presence of God in 
relations among humans whom anthropologists 
try to understand.
There is evidently politics involved. It is more 
urgent to speak about Islam and Muslims when 
they are the subject of Western policies and na-
tionalist fears in a way that God is not. It is easier to 
talk about religion than about God when secular-
ism is the hegemonic political framework. Posi-
tionality matters. In a Western context, somebody 
who has a relationship of faith with the One God 
of the Qur’an, absurdly enough, is more likely to 
be dismissed as biased when speaking about Him 
than somebody who follows a competing mono-
theist faith or who is speaking from a position 
of non-faith or unbelief (in Muslim-majority con-
texts, the opposite is often the case).
But there is no unbiased position. Rather, each 
bias facilitates the perception of some things or as-
pects better than others. As somebody who grew 
up in the materialist faith of Marxist- Leninist 
communism (I lost the faith at around the age of 
seventeen, but it still structures my identity and 
sensibilities), I have learned to under stand God 
as a human artefact. But as an anthropologist, I 
have also come to recognise that this does not 
make Him any less important and powerful for 
people who have a relation of faith with Him and 
who understand that humans are God’s creation. 
In this article, I draw on the ways in which peo-
ple I know in Egypt relate with the God of the 
Qur’an and reflect on their relation. I also draw 
on the ways in which I have been involved in those 
reflections as somebody who does not share the 
faith but can learn to perform some of its expres-
sions.
This particular positionality and bias inform 
my key argument, namely that relations between 
humans and God can be understood and studied 
as a multitude of relationships of power. They also 
inspire my aspiration to think about God beyond 
the ontology debate in anthropology. Anthro-
pologists should recognise theistic ontologies in 
their own right. But they can also consider that 
some of God’s powers may be effective regardless 
of one’s ontological standpoint, no matter if we 
see in Him our Creator or our creation, or some-
thing altogether different.
This compels me to question whether the 
well-proven scientific imperative of methodolog-
ical atheism is always helpful. Considering per-
ceivable, knowable causes before considering 
not perceivable, unknown ones has undeniably 
been good for scientific progress. But in social 
sciences, avoiding God can result in a situation 
where we invent new unseen entities – which goes 
against the principle of Ockham’s razor, that is, 
the imperative to prefer explanations with few 
speculative assumptions over those that have 
many speculative assumptions. Methodologically, 
we are trained not to reckon with God, while we 
habitually engage with modernity, society, econo-
my, the state, the individual, religion, traditions, 
neoliberalism, the secular and so on; yet none of 
these entities, as it were, exist in the same way 
that, say, a schoolteacher or a marketplace exists. 
In fact, they are often highly elusive, even mysti-
fied beings.
Jon Bialecki (2014) has argued that it is possible 
to account for God as a social actor while main-
taining the imperative of methodological atheism 
by means of understanding Him as the effect of 
a hybrid network of objects. This is an important 
proposal, but I wonder if it is possible to follow it 
in a systematic manner without slipping into an 
unacknowledged theological (or atheological) jud-
gement, namely one that ecxcludes the possibility 
that God speaks to the evangelical Christians stud-
ied by Bialecki because they in fact are His chosen 
people. Yasmin Moll (2018) has argued vis-à-vis Bi-
alecki that although anthropologists should take 
talk about God seriously, they should not become 
involved in theological debates. Anthropological 
theories and debates may echo theological ones, 
and anthropologists can definitely learn a great 
deal from theological debates;3 but theologies are 
normative, even judgemental disciplines by defini-
tion, and anthropology should better maintain a 
position of agnostic indecision towards them. On a 
different note, Rane Willerslev and Christian Suhr 
(2018) have called attention to the unsettling ex-
periences of »leaps of faith« that anthropologists 
have faced in their fieldwork, and which we should 
not try to rationalise away. Mayanthi Fernando 
(2017) has gone a step further and proposes that 
we should take spirits seriously as a potential or 
actual part of a »supernatureculture« world. Dra-
wing on the work of Taha Abdelrahmane, Amin 
El-Yousfi (forthcoming) proposes to ground the 
study of Islamic ethics in a theological philoso-
phy of divine trusteeship, which implies replacing 
anthropology’s methodological relativism with an 
approach that integrates commitment and analy -
sis. I find Fernando’s and El-Yousfi’s proposals 
interesting to think with, but I hesitate to follow 
them. Taking intentional beings (animal, human, 
divine or spiritual) seriously in a full sense implies 
entering relations such as faith, trust, help, fear, 
enmity, agreement or disagreement with them. 
3 In my own work, for example, I have found Sunni Muslim 
theologies of freedom and predestination insightful to un-
derstand what it means to act as a human in a world ruled 
by greater powers.
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Abandoning methodological relativism and taking 
seriously claims about the reality of things implies 
an open-ended engagement with them that may re-
sult in affirming or rejecting them as true or false, 
helpful or dangerous, or in searching to revise and 
improve them. For pragmatic reasons, I prefer not 
to take that step. I tend to agree with Moll as well 
as Willerslev and Suhr, and propose that instead of 
methodological atheism (or methodological theism 
or animism, for that matter), one may, as a social 
scientist of any faith, also adopt a position of meth-
odological indecision and openness, and study the 
presence and power of God and other unseen be-
ings in human interactions, without having to de-
cide how that reality comes to be.
In this article, I make four proposals about how 
anthropologists may account for the monotheist 
God as a social reality, embodying and enacting a 
form of power that makes us, and through which 
we make ourselves, in manifold and also con trary 
ways. The first proposal is to pay ethno graphic 
attention to the way in which different specific 
powers of God are present in human interactions 
through linguistic references and the search for 
guidance and sustenance. The second proposal is 
to consider more systematically the forms of rela-
tional or relationship power that God commands 
over humans. The third proposal is to pay attention 
to the productive tensions and conflicts that arise 
from encounters with a God who is both harshly 
punishing and merciful, disciplining and sustain-
ing, the Life-giver and the Death-bringer. The 
fourth proposal is to think of secularity or »the 
secular« as a reconfiguration of the human–God 
relationship in which humans are empowered, and 
whereby a triadic relationship in which God acts 
as supreme mediator between humans is weak-
ened, transformed or partially replaced by sepa-
rate relationships.
These proposals are by no means exhaustive, 
and the overall argument I put forward is not 
new. It is largely common sense in the Middle 
East. It is also no news to scholars in theologies, 
religious studies and intellectual histories who 
have a major record of thinking about God in va-
rious ways – so major that I cannot engage with 
it in the limited framework of this article, which 
acknowledgedly has a social scientific tunnel vi-
sion. Also Western philosophy and sociology have 
a record of taking God seriously. Anthropology, 
in contrast, has a strong record of accounting for 
spirits, ancestors, saints and other unseen com-
panions, but only more recently also the mono-
theist God.
Anthropologies of Christianity have had a head 
start in thinking about God, perhaps thanks to 
greater attention on materiality (Meyer 2015), re-
lationality (Orsi 2004) and the theoretical influ-
ence of Bruno Latour (1993; see, e.g., Keane 2007; 
Luhrmann 2012; Bialecki 2014). Anthro pologies 
of Islam have given comparably more attention 
to ethics, politics and identity, and have been 
more informed by the work of Michel Foucault 
(1984). This has often contributed to a primarily 
this-worldly analysis of discursive power, where-
by the authors of discourse (whether divine or hu-
man) and the otherworldly horizons of ethical ac-
tion were, initially at least, not the primary focus 
of attention. In a critical engagement with that 
line of study (Schielke 2010),  I have in the past 
argued (among other things) that too much focus 
on Islam results in attributing to a conceptual en-
tity power that properly speaking is God’s. That 
part of my argument remained marginal, how-
ever, in a debate about how to understand ethics 
and everyday life. I cannot go into the details of 
that debate here (see Fadil and Fernando 2015; 
Schielke 2015; Deeb 2015), but it is worth point-
ing out that while the debate brought up different 
understandings of everyday life and ethical be-
coming, it also less explicitly points at a shared 
interest in including the unseen and superhuman 
in the analysis. In her rejoinder to the debate, Na-
dia Fadil (2015) argues:
Furthermore, what is not the everyday? It is in-
deed hard to imagine any situation mediated 
by human interaction that would not be part 
of the everyday. Are objects part of everyday 
life? Animals? Plants? Angels? Miracles? (Fadil 
2015, 98)
We seem to differ on the everyday. In my under-
standing, everyday is not a class of situations or 
objects. Everyday is an attribute, a qualifier that 
characterises the recurring, goes-without- saying, 
undramatic, pragmatic and regular livelihood- 
related qualities of actions, situations, experiences 
and ways of reasoning vis-à-vis their potential 
extra ordinary, dramatic, liminal, systematically 
reflected qualities. Nearly all things and situa-
tions mediated by human interaction that can be 
everyday can also be exceptional and extraordi-
nary.  So in contrast to Fadil, I would argue that 
situations mediated by human interaction that 
are not everyday are manifold and easy to im-
agine: revo lutions, weddings, accidents, romantic 
encounters, pilgrimages; and yet all of them can 
be made everyday when they become routinised, 
such as in established revolutionary regimes, 
in the work of ambulance drivers and wedding 
photo graphers or in the lives of inhabitants of 
Mecca.
However, in another regard our concerns show 
an important convergence. Fadil mentions mira-
cles (which are extraordinary by definition but 
for people serving a pilgrimage site can become 
routine) and angels (who can indeed be everyday 
companions, just as their interventions might also 
be extraordinary), and thinking along that line of 
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thought I would add Resurrection Day, Paradise, 
Hell and most importantly God. Resurrection Day 
as an anticipated event is the liminal moment of 
ultimate truth par excellence, neither routine nor 
ordinary. But the anticipation of judgement can of 
course be routine and ordinary; and making that 
anticipation part of one’s ordinary routines is a 
central aim of the Islamic revival. I think that Fadil 
and I agree on that. This is also true of God. The 
power of God is inseparable from everyday living 
when His commandments are cultivated as part 
of one’s life and moral being, when He is includ-
ed in conversations by means of invocations and 
when His gifts bear fruits as material livelihood 
(themes to which I return in the next section). 
But none of this would have the compelling pow-
er of authority and promise if it weren’t for the 
transcendent reality and truth over and above or-
dinary existence He claims. Ritual practice often 
involves searching contact with His transcendent 
otherworldly reality, without this conflicting with 
the same practice’s more or less ethically form-
ative effect in this world. God’s immanent pres-
ence as a close companion dialectically coexists 
with His transcendent supremacy as well as the 
transcendent supremacy of His revelation.
This is something that Liza Debevec and I (2012) 
were approaching in our book Ordinary Lives and 
Grand Schemes – but we did not yet include God 
in our thinking, which is a main shortcoming of 
the book. »Schemes« tend to be systemic, ideolog-
ical or idealistic more than personal. Some ways 
of speaking about »Islam«, »the Church« or »true 
religion« do have that quality, but even when they 
do they are also about the relationships that hu-
mans have with God, prophets and saints. Just 
like a theory of ethics that knows of nothing out-
side the everyday misses something important, so 
does a theory of religion that deals with schemes 
but not with God and prophets.
Luckily, many recent anthropological contribu-
tions have come up with textured understandings 
of how humans live with the God of the Qur’an. 
Contributions that have inspired this essay in-
clude dream visions and the elsewhere (Mitter-
maier 2011), livelihood (Nevola 2015a; Gaibazzi 
2015), destiny (Elliot 2016; Menin 2015; Menin and 
Elliot 2018), death and resurrection (Hirschkind 
2006), moral relations that involve God (Schaeu-
blin 2016), the striving for paradise (Mittermai-
er 2019), theological talk about God (Moll 2018) 
and encounters with transcendence (Abenante 
and Vicini 2017). »Towards an Ethnography of 
God« was the title of a panel organised by Amira 
Mittermaier and Omri Elisha at the 2016 annual 
meeting of the American Anthropological Associ-
ation. This emerging body of work also builds on 
and intertwines with longer-standing enquiries 
into invisible realms (Drieskens 2008; Suhr 2015; 
Doostdar 2018), and the veneration of the Prophet 
Muhammad (Mahmood 2009) and Muslim saints 
(Abu-Zahra 1997).
Figure 1: »Don’t forget to say the name God.« Sticker in a barber shop in northern Egypt, 2016. 
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With this essay, I follow in the footsteps of those 
contributions, and reflect on the power of the 
monotheist God as it is recognised and reckoned 
by Muslim Egyptians I have worked and lived 
with during the past two decades. This article is 
not based on dedicated fieldwork about God, but 
instead on the accumulated knowledge of many 
years of fieldwork and friendship in various con-
texts with Egyptians from different walks of life. I 
have learned much in situations that were not un-
derstood to be research encounters by the people 
involved. Some people I know in Egypt consider 
their relationship with God to be a highly private 
and intimate matter, so parts of this article are 
intentionally vague in their references to specific 
people and contexts. However, three people make 
an explicit appearance. Because much of my field-
Figure 2: »Oh God, heal our sick and have mercy upon our 
dead.« Cairo, March 2010.
Figure 3: »My hijab is religion, not fashion. Hijab that pleases 
the Merciful, or fashion that pleases Satan. God is great, 
Praise to God.« Poster by the Muslim Brotherhood (unsigned 
but recognisable by design and slogan) in northern Egypt, 
February 2010.
Figure 4: »In the name of the All-Merciful God {Whatever 
good things you may have, it is from God} This is the true 
speech of the Mighty God«. Part of a Qur’anic verse (16:53) 
that is associated with the provision by God of material 
goods and blessings (ni‘ma) and livelihood (rizq), painted on 
the wall of a café in Alexandria, February 2014.
Figure 5: »Allah«. Transportable name of God made of electric 
lights at the annual festival (mulid) of al-Sayyida Fatima al- 
Nabawiya in Cairo, March 2008.
work in the past seven years has been in literary 
circles in Alexandria, two of them are poets, and 
the third is a master of improvised poetic expres-
sion in conversations. The role of poetic language 
and poetry is not only a fieldwork contingency. 
Language is a key means (but of course not the 
only one) of communication with and about God. 
Poetic language can make God’s presence tan-
gible among humans. At times it can also be in-
volved in a heretical rethinking of that presence.
Don’t forget to say the name of God
The most difficult part of learning Arabic for me 
was to learn to speak with older people in the vil-
lage in northern Egypt where I began to conduct 
fieldwork in 2006. One part of the difficulty I en-
countered was the local dialect, which is different 
 6
Programmatic Texts 13 · ZMO · Samuli Schielke · The power of God · 2019
from the Arabic spoken in Egyptian cities. But the 
part that required the longer learning process, 
and one that I have still not mastered well, was un-
derstanding that so much communication among 
humans has God as a third party.
Islamic traditions of pious speech do not share 
the Biblical taboo against taking »the name of the 
Lord thy God in vain« (Exodus 20,7). The Qur’an 
repeatedly urges the faithful to remember and 
mention (udhkuru) God. Stickers and graffiti with 
the message »Say the name of God« (Udhkur illah) 
proliferate in vehicles, homes, streets and shops 
around Egypt (Figure 1). The name and words of 
God are present – and in the wake of the Islamic 
revival have become more so – in the sound of the 
Qur’an and sermons and in visible public writing 
(Hirschkind 2006; Starrett 1995). The presence 
they generate highlights different aspects of God’s 
power over humans, such as healing and forgiv-
ing (Figure 2), disciplining (Figure 3; see also 
Figure 6 further below), livelihood (Figure 4) and 
confirming His presence and inviting experience 
(Figure 5).
While learning Arabic, I soon understood that 
answering »God willing« (in sha’ Allah) to a ques-
tion could be a polite way to say yes, a polite way 
to say no or a polite way to avoid saying either yes 
or no – depending on context and intonation. Later 
I understood that for many speakers the proposi-
tional thrust of »God willing« was not about saying 
yes or no in the first place, but about recognising 
that either way it is up to the will of God. I also 
learned that the answer to »how are you?« was 
»praise to God« (al-hamdu lillah), which means that 
praise is always to God, no matter how one is do-
ing. (Sometimes, the word of praise is spoken in a 
defeated, depressed voice that indicates one is not 
well at all.) Again, it took me longer to understand 
that the main point of the phrase is not telling 
how one is doing, but expressing contentedness 
with the will of God – a major virtue that God has 
promised to reward well.4 Although these expres-
sions are Islamic in origin, they are also used by 
Arabic-speaking Christians. Even people who have 
little faith in God use them routinely. Their per-
vasive power is based on their being both a con-
ventional linguistic performance between humans 
and an act of faith that will be heard and rewarded 
by God. They thrive on the open-endedness of a 
triadic relation between human-oriented polite-
ness and God-oriented faith, whereby the human 
or the divine dimension may be more pronounced 
depending on speaker and context.
4 For example, in Surat Ibrahim (14,7): »If you are grateful, 
I will certainly give to you more« (la’in shakartum la-azidan-
nakum). Ritual prayer (salat) includes the line »God listens 
to those who praise Him« (sami‘a llahu li-man hamidahu), 
based on prophetic practice.
People with whom I learned to speak better Ar-
abic in the village use these expressions often, but 
they do not satisfy themselves with simply reiter-
ating them. Especially among women born before 
the 1970’s, I have often encountered an eloquent 
and poetic flow of invocations to God that He may 
protect, care, help, guide, sustain, heal, reconcile, 
console, retaliate, forbid… I, too, have learned a 
few phrases that feature God, often referred to as 
»our Lord« (rabbina) or by one of His ninety-nine 
canonic names or other attributes. For example: 
Allah yusluh halkum – May God make your condi-
tion well (a general wish for well-being); Rabbina 
yikhallihumlak – May our Lord keep them for you 
(said to somebody about their children or family); 
Rabbina yikfik sharr al-marad, ya rabb! – May our 
Lord keep the evil of sickness away from you, oh 
Lord; Allah yigawwik – May God give you strength; 
Rabbina yihdik - May our Lord guide you (meaning 
you’re stupid, foolish or crazy; it can also be an 
appreciation of someone’s piety); Allah yisamhak – 
May God forgive you (meaning you’re wrong and 
should apologise, sometimes also used jokingly); 
Allah yarhamha – May God have mercy on her (said 
about deceased people); Rabbina yakhduh – May 
our Lord take him (meaning I hope he drops dead; 
this is not said in jest); Ya Satir – Oh Protector 
(said in the face of danger); Ya Musahhil – Oh Who 
Makes Things Easy (said in the face of problems); 
and Ya Latif – Oh Kind One (said when in pain).
I have never learned to use these and other ex-
pressions with the poetic eloquence of the people 
I learned them from. But over the years, I have 
learned how to speak and reply with invocations in 
return, and thereby I have, however imperfectly, 
learned to embody the position of a person who 
puts their trust in God, who addresses God for help 
and guidance, and whose relations with other hu-
mans involve God as a third party. Such learning 
is a case in point for the ethical power of acts and 
utterances that Saba Mahmood (2005) argued for, 
but it also reminds that such ethical power is open 
ended, that intention makes a difference, and that 
communicating and acting with others is key to 
moral and ethical practices.
People with whom I have learned to speak Ara-
bic in the presence of God have followed various 
paths in their lives. Some have more and others 
less consistently tried to follow His command-
ments (that is, the Shari‘a, which is not the same 
as law) in their worship of God (‘ibada) and their 
interaction with other humans (mu‘amala). All have 
been searching for their rizq, legitimate worldly 
income or sustenance provided by God. They have 
faced at times lucky, at times devastating turns 
of nasib, the materialisation of God’s predestined 
decree or what from a materialist point of view 
is called luck. Some among them have at times re-
flected to me about din (approximately »religion«) as 
a moral, political, ritual and metaphysical frame-
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work.5 Some people I know have been for some 
periods of time very keen to gain a knowledge of 
God – not so much in the sense of the Shari‘a-based 
disciplinary knowledge of right and wrong, but 
more in the sense of Sufi Muslim traditions that 
have a long history of highlighting the search for 
an experience and encounter with the transcend-
ent.6 All of them have also been committed to some 
other strivings that they have not framed in terms 
of din/religion. In the course of their strivings and 
setbacks alike, they have all been cultivating re-
lationships of trust, hope, guidance, support or 
encounters with God in a wider sense that both 
includes and exceeds din/religion in the limited 
sense of normative doctrine and practice. 
Few among the people who are younger than 
me, however, express these relations with the elo-
quence that I have encountered among many peo-
ple above my age.
Born in the late 1950s, al-Hajja Z is the widowed 
mother of three and grandmother of seven by the 
most recent count. She radiates motherly author-
ity, has a good sense of humour and can be sharp 
if needed. She belongs to the first generation of 
girls in the village who attended school. Her style 
of expression stands on the generational threshold 
between the verbal eloquence of a society where 
most people could not read, and the increasingly 
textual references and communications learned by 
many among the younger generations. Like most 
women of her generation and social background, 
she puts her trust in God and is religious by any 
account. Unlike most women of her age and social 
milieu, she is also very interested in politics and 
has outspoken political views.
In spring 2012, Mukhtar Shehata and I recorded 
with her an interview where she told of her hopes 
and confusions regarding the 2011 revolution, the 
outcome of which was not yet apparent. After open-
ing with »In the name of the All-Merciful God«, 
she started to tell us of the joy she felt about the 
outbreak of the revolution, and related it to the in-
justices that she and her two sons had faced owing 
to a property conflict in the village and oppressive 
employers in Saudi Arabia, where her sons were 
5 »Religion« as a social scientific concept and din as an Is-
lamic theological concept are not quite the same, the latter 
being more encompassing and, most importantly, normative 
and exclusive. It is commonly claimed that only Islam, Chris-
tianity and Judaism qualify as being a din, and also that only 
Islam is the proper din authorised by God. In both ordinary 
and academic language, din is distinguished from tadayyun, 
»religiosity«, which describes the actual ways in which hu-
mans follow a religion/din. As a social scientist, I would in 
Arabic claim to study tadayyun, not din.
6 As Amira Mittermaier (2011), Paola Abenante and Fabio 
Vicini (2017) have pointed out, the Sufi search for commu-
nication with God seldom shares an ontology of authentic 
individuality, and instead focuses on the capacity and expe-
rience of being subject to God’s immense power on an invis-
ible (batin) level.
working in low-income jobs. In the course of the 
interview, she occasionally included God in her ac-
count in different capacities. With regard to the 
property conflict, she addressed Him as the Pro-
vider (al-Raziq):
I would give him [the lawyer] 100 pounds every 
month,7 and keep the 200 pounds [remaining of 
her widow’s rent]; our Lord alone knows that 
they’re gone the next day. I don’t know how I live 
the rest of the month. Our sublime and exalt-
ed Lord (rabbina subhanahu wa-ta‘ala) provides 
(byurzug).
When talking about her hope for security and 
justice for ordinary people, she addressed God as 
the initiator of conscience:
I pray (bad‘i) to our sublime and exalted Lord 
that He gives everybody their conscience, in 
every position, whether officer or civilian. There 
is only our sublime and exalted Lord from whom 
we ask, because He can change the hearts; the 
hearts are in the hand of our sublime and exalt-
ed Lord. […] Because if people see our Lord, the 
entire country will be just (tit‘idil).
She went on to address the need to educate peo-
ple (she has a keen sense of not knowing enough 
and a desire to know more) about what human 
rights are, and to provide the moral and profes-
sional foundations on which the development of 
the country can proceed. This brought her back to 
the situation of Egyptian migrant workers abroad, 
who often have to endure grave injustices – some-
thing she knew all too well from her sons: 
We say »Oh Lord« and He shall reward us (yijazi-
na): but those who demand justice must … those 
who demand justice (‘adala) and equality (mu-
sawah), if only they also looked after these people.
Towards the end of the interview, God became 
more present in her speech, as she wove together 
her hope for change, her trust in God’s predeter-
mined decree, her sense of the urgency and neces-
sity of taking action, her frustration and confusion 
about the situation in general, and a moral admo-
nition towards those committing injustice:
Z: So if I had the means to go to that square, or 
if it were close to me, or if somebody could take 
me there, I would have joined them, because I 
believe that our sublime and exalted Lord does 
not change the condition of a people until they 
7 In 2011, 100 Egyptian pounds was equivalent to about 
12 to 13 euros.
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change what is in themselves.8 So if I [unclear]; 
what happens is that we escape from God’s pre-
destined decree to God’s predestined decree 
(min qada’ illah li-qada’ illah). If I’m inside the 
house, it will also hit me. But I do something I 
can meet God with, that I can say to Him: I did, 
oh Lord. All I did was praying (bad‘i) to Him, I 
was standing in front of them [meaning the dem-
onstrators she saw on television]; changing and 
switching channels on television. But I feel that 
they don’t say the truth. They say one eighth of 
the truth! I don’t feel… There is a channel that 
makes me feel frustrated, and another chan-
nel… I don’t know which one to believe!
Mukhtar: Last word, Hajja. How do you see to-
morrow?
Z: Tomorrow will be good, God willing (in sha’ 
Allah), with the commandment of God (bi-amr 
illah) because He commands. Our sublime and 
exalted Lord, the hearts of the people are pure. 
You say: Oh Lord! It will not make you shy, 
Mukhtar. Our sublime and exalted Lord will not 
let anyone go to waste. We have lived… I’m 53 
years old, I have lived my life and lacked noth-
ing. If I get a thousand [pounds] I will live on 
them, if I get three hundreds I will live on them. 
Either way, I will live on them. I won’t die for 
them. But I’m defeated (maghura) because those 
people who made sacrifices [in the revolution] 
still don’t stand on their feet. I’m not defeated 
because of myself, but because of everybody. I 
say to our Lord: Oh Lord, let everyone find their 
conscience, and know that they stand in front 
of a Generous Lord, [the pitch of her voice in-
creases and she raises her hand for emphasis] 
and they will be alone in the grave, and they will 
be questioned! There will be a day when they 
stand alone in isolation and darkness; nobody 
will stand by them, and no money and nothing 
else will work. And nobody will get more than is 
written (maktub) for them.
An interview was not an everyday speech situa-
tion for al-Hajja Z. She had prepared carefully, and 
the outcome was quite unlike the rapid exchanges 
of words and phrases that she entertains in more 
conversational settings. But the way she con cluded 
her account (that otherwise mentioned God only 
occasionally) with a series of invocations and ad-
monitions reminds me of the use of invocations to 
conclude one’s speech in everyday contexts.
The political theme of the interview let her 
emphasise matters of justice, conscience, the ul-
timate responsibility one has for one’s acts and 
the inevitability of divine predestination. Other 
8 This is a citation from the Qur’an, 13,11: inna llaha la yu-
ghayyiru bi-qawmin hatta yughayiru ma bi-anfusihim.
conversastions might have had a different focus. 
And yet it is remarkable in how many different 
capacities God became part of the conversation: 
as a provider, as the one who listens to prayers, 
as the one who can instil in hearts a will for the 
right and good, as the judge after death and the 
one who writes destinies, and the ultimate witness 
of justice and injustice between humans. Because 
of the political focus, yet other dimensions such as 
worship, proper ritual action or health and sick-
ness did not arise, although al-Hajja Z would cer-
tainly affirm them if asked. Remarkably, she did 
not speak about religion/din or Islam even once. 
And while she is sympathetic of Salafi preachers 
and Islamist political movements (albeit with some 
doubts and misgivings), she articulated the future 
improvement of Egypt that she envisioned in rather 
unspecified terms of an increase of knowledge and 
responsible behaviour. The moral problem she ad-
dressed was not a meticulous ethical enquiry about 
the correct shape of human interaction with each 
other and their worship of God, but rather the need 
to put an end to blatant and obvious injustice and 
oppression.
Al-Hajja Z helps us to understand how God 
emer ges as a constitutive third party of relations 
among humans in communication and interaction. 
Furthermore, her focus on justice, responsibility 
and destiny reminds us that speaking with God is 
usually not about establishing coherence (which it 
might be if she had tried to formulate a correct 
doctrinal understanding of what is and what is not 
justice, or how exactly responsibility and predes-
tination come together),9 but about getting to the 
point, and firmly so.
Al-Hajja Z also helps us to think of God’s power as 
a moral authority in a way that exceeds (but does 
not contradict) the disciplinary mode of moral 
enquiry that has been perhaps the most produc-
tive theme in the anthropology of Islam under the 
keywords ethics and piety. The first wave of piety 
and ethics studies highlighted Islam’s this-worldly 
continuity as a discursive tradition, and the ways 
in which pious Muslims worked towards craft-
ing a God-fearing self. Authors of the first wave 
of ethics and piety studies were well aware of the 
role of God in the process, as they were of the ul-
timate aim of Paradise after death that motivates 
ethical practice in this world (e.g. Mahmood 2005, 
140–145; Hirschkind 2006, 173–204). And yet God 
and the afterworld remained marginal to a theory 
that focuses on traditions of debate, pedagogies of 
conduct and ethical becoming in this world. In al-
Hajja Z’s speech, in comparison, God is the focal 
point of moral trust, conscience is a divine gift to 
9 Such questions have inspired sophisticated intellectual, 
theological, and political debates over the centuries, and do 
so also today. See, e.g. al-Ash‘ari 1980; Vasalou 2008; Fahmy 
2018. 
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be accepted and the key moment of enquiry comes 
after death. How may these and other dimensions 
be thought together? 
Studying zakat (almsgiving) and voluntary giv-
ing for God (sadaqa) in Nablus, Palestine, Emanuel 
Schaeublin (2016) has highlighted the triadic form 
of the moral relationship of giving, which always 
involves God as a supreme third party and guaran-
tor. In her work on charity in Cairo, Amira Mitter-
maier (2014; 2019) has addressed different modal-
ities of giving and exchange between humans and 
God, such as those expressed by the concepts of 
thawab (reward) and baraka (blessing), where the 
first is earned by humans for good deeds, while 
the second is a form of unconditional generosity 
by God. Laura Menin (2015) and Alice Elliot (2016) 
have drawn attention to destiny as an intimate 
part of love relations, flirtation and the search for 
a marital partner in Morocco. The active search to 
find one’s destiny, Menin and Elliot (2018) argue, 
is about openness and receptivity towards the su-
preme agency and authorship of God – in line with 
the currently mainstream Ash‘ari theology of des-
tiny, whereby the power or potency (qadar) to cre-
ate action is only God’s, but humans actualise or ac-
quire (the theological concept is kasb, acquisition) 
their predetermined destiny from their own will 
and with full responsibility (Al-Ash‘ari 1980, 538-
542; Bhat 2006). Paolo Gaibazzi (2015) has shown 
how Gambian men who search for wealth through 
migration, diamond mining and trade trust that 
God has predetermined for each of them their own 
share of »luck«, the English translation used in the 
Gambia for the Islamic concept of rizq. Working in 
northern Yemen, Luca Nevola (2015b) has argued 
that rizq and destiny are power ful, God-centred 
»models of« (Geertz 1973) that describe how the 
world is and works for the pious and the impious 
alike. They have a descriptive power that differs 
from the prescriptive power of ideals of ethical 
and moral becoming that work as »models for«, to 
follow Geertz’s language.
For al-Hajja Z, these capacities go hand in hand. 
Some other people I know have given more or less 
emphasis to some capacities over others. Learning 
Arabic in the village thus meant for me not only 
the acknowledgement and involvement of God as 
a third party in human interactions, but also to 
realise that His involvement and power may be 
of different kinds in different situations and re-
quire different cultivated skills and attitudes by 
humans. Cultivation of a relationship with God in-
volves both active as well as receptive attitudes 
by humans: proactively striving, working and wor-
shipping, recognising and hoping for divine gifts 
and inspiration, accepting destiny as it comes. It 
may involve different temporal horizons: more 
afterworldly when it comes to justice and ethical 
discipline, more this-worldly when it comes to the 
search for rizq. Powers of God can be experienced 
as the immanent substance of ordinary life, ap-
proached as a transcendent truth of theological 
enquiry or encountered in the path of mystical 
search.
I do not aim to provide a systematic exposition. 
There are other dimensions that I have not ad-
dressed or am not aware of, and in any case the 
search for guidance, coherence, sustenance and 
experience are evidently not mutually exclusive. 
They reinforce each other much of the time, but 
they are also not necessarily mutually dependent.
However, because these relations – what-
ever their emphasis – almost always involve an 
acknowled ge ment of His immense power, it does 
make sense to think of the human–God relation-
ship as a power relation; or, more specifically, as 
relational power.
Relational and relationship power
The most compelling theory of relational power re-
mains the one developed and elaborated by Michel 
Foucault, especially in his later work on bio power 
(the power of discourses to shape and regulate 
the lives of the populace) and governmentality 
(2007). For the sake of a thought experiment, we 
might try to understand the power of God along 
the lines drawn by Foucault as a relationship that 
constitutes and structures communal and individ-
ual moral trajectories. However, this would not be 
a binary this-worldly relationship between a dis-
course and a subject, but a triadic relationship 
where God (along with the Apostle of God and, in 
some versions of the relationship, the friends of 
God) connects humans in this world and the after-
world alike (Salvatore 2008; Schaeublin 2016). We 
might also think about His power in terms of what 
it produces: conditions of human life, thriving, 
reproduction, well-being, success – but also their 
limits: sickness, failure, death. In that sense God 
could be seen to be involved in biopower, which 
importantly includes necropower (Mbembe 2003), 
the power over life’s end. God of the Qur’an is both 
the Life-giver (al-Muhyi) and the Death-bringer 
(al-Mumit). As much as His power is personal, in-
timate and suggestive of affects, it also involves 
some very Clausewitzian domination by direct 
force. And it is evidently strategic, involving an 
omniscient master plan that humans encounter in 
the shape of destiny. In any case – and this would 
accord with Foucault’s work on human biopower – 
the power of God is not limiting but productive. It 
is creation.
But although the power of God has aspects that 
resemble biopower, I do not propose to study it in 
that framework. For one thing, God does not deal 
with populations in Foucault’s sense. The relation 
of power involved is more intimate and personal. 
The monotheist God does not create populations 
made up of individualised subjects; He creates 
communities of humans bound by moral ties in a 
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triadic relation with one another and God (Salva-
tore 2008, Schaeublin 2016). Furthermore, in con-
trast to the discursive procedures that Foucault’s 
work relied on, His »procedures« are invisible and 
beyond human knowledge.
What one can study as an anthropologist – 
regard less of one’s theological or atheological 
judgement, belief or faith – is how the power of 
God emerges as something tangible when it is ad-
dressed, anticipated and enacted in human inter-
action. Above, I gave an example that highlights 
conversation and language, but God’s power can 
also emerge and be communicated through other 
senses, bodily practices, objects and mediated im-
ages. Birgit Meyer (2015) has addressed the often 
quite tangible materiality of the Divine in human 
interaction: the invisible other world, in order to 
be accessed by humans, needs material mediation 
in the shape of media productions, objects, archi-
tectures, scripts and more.
In her work on Northern Irish Pentecostals, Hilary 
Foye (2015) uses Bruno Latour’s idea about human 
and non-human »hybrid networks« to under stand 
how humans position themselves in relation to 
God. In fact it may be to a large measure thanks to 
Latour that social scientists have recently become 
more easy-going about their distinctions between 
humans and things, intentional subjects and con-
sequential objects. With Latour, we can recognise 
that humans are not that special and unique, and 
that agentic power is embodied by all kinds of be-
ings in complex networks. Latour points out that 
his approach also allows us to bring God back into 
social scientific analysis:
Do we need to add that the crossed-out God, 
in this new Constitution, turns out to be liber-
ated from the unworthy position to which He 
had been relegated? The question of God is re-
opened, and the nonmoderns no longer have to 
try to generalize the improbable metaphysics of 
the moderns that forced them to believe in be-
lief. (Latour 1993, 142)
No wonder that some anthropologists of Chris-
tianity (see also Bialecki 2014; Luhrmann 2012; 
Keane 2007) in particular have found Latour good 
to think with. Important tensions remain, however. 
Latour’s vision is an animist one, which may work 
well with spirits, saints, science and technology, 
and non-human living beings. Monotheism and an-
imism, in contrast, do not make good bedfellows. 
Latour proposes a »parliament of things« (1993, 
142-145). But the God of the Bible and the Qur’an 
is an absolutist autocrat who doesn’t share power 
with republican institutions. Latour’s ontology is 
flat, monotheism’s is hierarchical.
James Laidlaw (2013, 185) has pointed out that 
Latour’s actors in network lack one crucial part 
of what makes something or somebody an actor: 
the expectation of moral responsibility. Responsi-
bility, in turn, requires intention and moral ac-
countability. This, Laidlaw says, is not the case in 
actor-networks. And yet at least some of Latour’s 
non-humans are commonly treated by humans as 
responsible actors in Laidlaw’s sense. Intention 
and responsibility are an intuitive and therefore 
also in practice very compelling basis for human 
interaction. Humans do not generally try to ver-
ify whether they are dealing with an intention-
al being unless they have a specific reason to do 
so. Instead, intention and responsibility seem 
to be the taken-for-granted default assumption. 
This can be a compelling and sensible way to act 
with non-humans too. That is what animism is all 
about, and it is also what nationalism is about, 
and it is how leftists often speak of capitalism. 
Social scientists commonly treat concepts and 
abstractions as intentional beings: »neo-liberal-
ism«, »the state«, »the secular«, »Islam« and oth-
ers often appear as remarkably conscious beings 
who aim, attempt and strive – and may be held 
accountable.
Of all non-humans, divine beings are among the 
most explicitly intentional – and the most powerful. 
The monotheist God of the Bible and the Qur’an in 
particular builds strong moral and emotional re-
lations with humans. This is relational power in a 
different sense to Foucault’s. It comes closer to the 
contemporary English vernacular use of »relation-
ships« as intimate bonds. Such bonds connect not 
only humans who share a life in this world; they 
also link »heaven and earth«, as shown by Robert 
Orsi (2005) in his work on the American Catholics 
he grew up with. This kind of »relationship power« 
is effective by means of intimate, emotional bonds 
of friendship, enmity, love, anger, fear, trust, help, 
guidance and importantly gratefulness.
A power to which one can be grateful – this 
seems to be a crucial part of the human–God re-
lationship known as Islam. And this was the key 
point about learning to speak Arabic with God as 
third party in conversations.
At least among the Muslim Egyptians I know, 
the possibility of and search for gratefulness goes 
along with a strong emotional taboo against an-
ger and ungratefulness towards God. The Arabic 
concept for unbelief, kufr, etymologically means 
ungratefulness. There are elaborate techniques 
to not express anger or blame towards God. The-
ologically, Satan is identified as the source of evil 
– often as a semi-internal force who drives one to 
act in immoral ways.10 In Arabic poetry, existen-
tial laments conventionally address dunya, »this 
10 Remarkably, Satan is even more absent than God in an-
thropologies of Islam. On ways in which Satan takes respon-
sibility for deeds and desires that otherwise might be at-
tributed to oneself or to God, see Gregg 2007; al-‘Azm 1969, 
55–87.
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world«, for its cruelty and injustice in order not to 
place blame on God.11 As Saba Mahmood (2015) 
has shown in her work on piety activists, cultiva-
tion of the fear of God and His punishment is a 
key part of the work of becoming a pious person in 
the framework of the Islamic revival. Piety, a free 
translation of the Arabic taqwa, is the quality of 
somebody who unites fear of God and trust in God, 
and who has internalised His commandments. It 
is ideally a state of peace of mind (itmi’nan), and 
I have encountered a few (often older) people who 
appeared to embody it. But often, striving for that 
condition is marked by a cultivated anxiety about 
the state of one’s heart and acts, whether one’s 
deeds are accepted and rewarded or not by God.
Such anxious and hopeful cultivation is today 
the most visible and politically most contested 
way to relate to the God of the Qur’an, but not to 
the exclusion of other ways. Moreover, people who 
do not actively or consistently cultivate the fear of 
God often ask Him for a kind of support for which 
they may be grateful. During sickness and other 
crises, otherwise rather impious people may speak 
in invocations or call others to join them in asking 
for God’s help: id‘i li »call upon God for me«. Social 
media has become an important medium for such 
requests, and online calls for invocations for the 
sick and announcements about friends and rela-
tives passing away result in lengthy comment sec-
tions with invocations for healing and success, and 
for God’s mercy to the dead. They are another case 
of triadic communication where invocation (du‘a’) 
is a way of showing mutual support and solidari-
ty among humans by means of collectively asking 
God to grant His help and protection.
The issue of healing and sickness is also helpful 
in understanding the coexistence of God-centred 
and other ontologies in lived practice. The onto-
logical turn in anthropology has been helpful in 
understanding human–God relations, although 
perhaps not in the sense of self-containing islands 
as in Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s (2003) famous 
»conceptual, I mean ontological, self-determi-
nation of people. Or peoples to be more exact.« 
With the universalist, expansive drive of mono-
theist faiths and with the translocal connectedness 
of the Middle Eastern region, such insular self- 
determination has not been the case in Egypt for a 
very long time. In Egypt today, health, sickness and 
healing in particular are the site of lively ontologi-
cal pluralism. People searching for healing in times 
of illness make use of coexisting yet different on-
tologies: the molecular ontology of biomedical ther-
apies, which people I know in Egypt tend to trust 
more than some people in my social circles in West-
11 I’m grateful to Dr Ahmed Saad Mohamed Saad of Ayn 
Shams University for this point.
ern Europe;12 the divine ontology of God’s power 
over life, healing and death, which motivates pa-
tients and their families to pray, sacrifice, call oth-
ers to pray, consult spiritual healers and act out 
the virtues of patience and contentedness with the 
will of God; and the ontology of humoural medicine 
in the tradition of Hellenic and Islamic techniques 
of healing (Hamdy 2009; Tabishat 2014). One rare-
ly encounters in Egypt the sense that these are al-
ternatives; rather, they coexist almost seamlessly.
God punishes harshly, and He is forgiving and 
merciful
The coexistence of different forms of power, even 
different ontologies, is also inherent to the hu-
man–God relationship known as Islam. This is well 
exemplified in the ninety-nine Beautiful Names of 
God, a list of divine attributes mentioned in the 
Qur’an that in Egypt is often displayed as printed 
calligraphy in homes and shops, and performed as 
an introductory song (composed by the influential 
twentieth-century popular musician Sayyid Mak-
kawi) at weddings. Most of the ninety-nine names 
are also human attributes, and when they come to-
gether in a human being they might be considered 
a contradiction or a form of ambivalence.
In the Qur’an, God says: َه َّل لا ََّنأَو ِباَقِع ْلا ُديِدَش َه َّل لا ََّنأ اوُم َل ْعا 
ٌميِحَر  ٌروُفَغ. I‘lamu anna llaha shadidu l-‘iqab wa-anna 
llaha ghafurun rahim. »Know that God is severe in 
punishment; and that God is forgiving and merci-
ful« (Surat al-Ma’ida, 5,98).
My attention was turned to this verse in June 
2016, during Ramadan, when a friend of mine 
whom I call B cited it on his Facebook page. Ram-
adan is a time when Muslims generally give more 
attention to God and worship, so it did not surprise 
me that B, who otherwise would publish sarcastic 
aphorisms, political and social critique, and exis-
tentialist love poetry on social media, would now 
be citing the Qur’an. But the verse struck me, as 
it did a few others who left their comments under-
neath. They noted that the same verse had made 
them stop and reflect. I asked B how he under-
stood the verse. He replied:
By God, my brother in God Samuli,13 this verse 
is for me the confirmation that the aspect of 
forgiving with its reality and necessity does not 
deny the existence of the aspect of punishment, 
and that’s natural because the divine subject 
(al-dhat al-ilahiya) in Islamic religion is the sub-
ject that carries all human attributes (sifat) in 
full divine power/extent (qadr), and which God 
12 To the degree that Egypt is facing the problem of 
drug-resistant bacteria as a consequence of excessive use 
of antibiotics; see El Kholy et al. 2003.
13 The address »my brother in God«, which would usually 
be used among people who share a religious striving, is used 
here by B jokingly.
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put into the human with his limited human pow-
er/extent, because He breathed into him His 
spirit. And [the verse is a confirmation] that the 
difference of the qualities themselves is appar-
ent in the Beautiful Names of God, where it says 
that the god (al-ilah) is the First (al-Awwal) and 
at the same time the Last (al-Akhir). And he is 
the Visible (al-Zahir) and the Invisible (al-Batin). 
That also confirms and explains the difference 
of the qualities humans have. Note: this is a per-
sonal interpretation that may be right or wrong.
In a private message, I then asked B for permis-
sion to quote his interpretation of the verse in a 
research article. He replied and clarified:
Of course, I have no problem. But Our Lord 
doesn’t have schizophrenia. Only we do
Then we went on to politely ask how each of us 
and our families were doing. He answered:
B: I’m fine. Fasting is getting tough on me, you 
lucky bastards    
Samuli: May God give you patience, and may 
your fasting be accepted.
In his replies, B addressed the fundamental 
tension between God’s capacity to unite all hu-
man qualities and the human incapacity to find 
a balance between them. There is a fundamental 
ambiguity involved in being subject to the power 
God: it is biopolitics and necropolitics at once, for 
God is the Life-giver and the Death-bringer in one 
person. It is pastoral and it is repressive, for God 
is forgiving and caring, punishing and severe. It 
makes sense for God, but humans try to be one or 
the other, and the unity of life and death, reward 
and punishment, visible and invisible can result in 
a schizophrenic experience of incommensurability 
in us.14
14 I am aware of the potential misunderstandings in-
volved in the metaphorical use of a pathological term bor-
rowed from psychology. In the metaphorical use by B and 
me in this article, schizophrenia is not a pathology, but a 
feature of human understanding. »Incommensurability« im-
plies that some discourses, ideas and practices cannot fit 
together in a coherent account or system. Describing an ex-
perience or knowledge as schizophrenic in a metaphorical 
sense, in contrast, implies that the things we try to know 
may very well exist together, but for various reasons we find 
it difficult or disturbing to think them together, and there-
fore treat them in a compartmentalised fashion as incom-
mensurable, and may shift between one and the other. I also 
prefer in this context »schizophrenic« to »ambiguous« or 
»ambivalent«, because the latter attributes do not describe 
limits of human understanding: on the contrary, ambiguous 
language and ambivalent affects may at times quite com-
fortably bring together things that otherwise might appear 
as incommensurables.
 This tension appears productive for lives that 
are lived in the guidance of the God of the Qur’an. 
It is not a one-dimensional force, as anybody even 
a little bit aware of the manifold and rich history 
and present of Muslim lands and peoples knows 
(see Ahmed 2016). Rather, this tension is among 
those productive dialectics that compel humans to 
take a stance – in one way or another – towards 
the forgiving and punishing, the visible and invisi-
ble, the disciplining and the sustaining, the closed 
and the open-ended dimensions of God’s relation 
with His creatures. As a relationship, the power 
of God requires that humans act in anticipation of 
it, thus actualising one attribute or another of the 
divine subject, living out the resulting tensions in 
one way or another.
B unites some irreverent views about God and 
humans, decidedly leftist and secularist politics 
and a consistent practice of worship. Additionally 
to fasting in Ramadan, he prays regularly, which is 
visible by a dark spot on his forehead. His idiosyn-
cratic ways also show in our online conversation. 
There is some irony in that I used the pious and 
polite language of invocations in reply to B, who 
jokingly complained about the difficulty of fasting 
in summer heat and envied non-Muslims who do 
not have to fast. And rather than trying to pres-
ent a »correct« (that is, authorised) understanding 
of the verse, he insisted that his interpretation of 
the verse was his own and as such was subject to 
error.
B’s way of being both pious and irreverent has a 
political, societal and historical context. It is linked 
to his upbringing in a communist family between 
a village and a major city, his educational and 
economic resources as a young, male, white-col-
lar employee in a private company, and his gen-
erational socialisation during the Islamic revival 
that in Egypt had successfully reconfigured parts 
of the human–God relation by the time he came of 
age in the 2000s. This context has provided him 
with a societal and spiritual mainstream in which 
he is at home yet not at ease, as well as specific 
resources to search for an alternative position. 
When God–human relations shift, so do human–
human relations, and vice versa. While the mono-
theist God does not share power with the parliament 
of things, He does delegate some tasks to humans. 
Despite the Qur’an’s strict monotheism, all Mus-
lim traditions involve some human intermediaries. 
Expressing faith in both God and his Messenger is 
the bare minimum of Islamic creed. For Muslims 
worldwide, God is the primary addressee of their 
prayers, but the Prophet Muhammad provides the 
ideal model for how to live and a very powerful fo-
cus of emotional attachment (Mahmood 2009). The 
Shi‘a tradition gives enormous importance to the 
spiritual leadership of Muhammad’s descendants. 
Sufi movements within the wider Sunni tradition 
have generated expansive networks and chains 
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of friends of God (or saints for the sake of an im-
precise translation), who in turn are spiritually 
and genealogically connected with the Prophet 
Muhammad (Mayeur-Jaouen 2005). Supporters of 
Salafi-oriented reform movements in the Sunni 
tradition commonly reject the Sufi veneration of 
friends of God and often consider Shia Muslims not 
to be Muslims at all. Foregrounding the demand 
to live as precisely as possible by the Shari‘a (the 
teachings about how to worship God and interact 
with humans), they emphasise the example of the 
Prophet Muhammad and his companions, who thus 
are reinforced in their position of privileged inter-
mediaries.
In Egypt, the twentieth century witnessed a shift 
in theological hegemony from Sufi hierarchies and 
chains of sainthood on the one hand and religious 
learning based on traditions of scholarly authority 
on the other, to a reformist emphasis on discipline 
and a direct access to scripture. There has been a 
shift in emphasis from a more personally mediat-
ed and distributed relationship with God towards 
one that is more textually mediated and unity ori-
ented. This shift also resonates with the individu-
alistic tendency of neoliberal capitalism, whereby 
some (but not all) of the moral thrust of following 
God’s commandments has shifted from communal 
discipline to self-discipline (Karlsson- Mignanti 2007; 
Abenante 2014). It has also gone hand in hand with 
increased sectarian tension between Muslims and 
Christians. Different configurations of triadic 
trust and solidarity, and correspondingly different 
sensibilities towards difference within and across 
traditions, faiths and identities seem to be at play 
here. In short, major political and societal strug-
gles are related to the question about how to live 
such relations.
Talal Asad (1986) has pointed out that struggles, 
debates and critique are an inherent constituent of 
a tradition (see also Salvatore and Eickelman 2004; 
Khan 2012; Aishima 2016; Ahmad 2017). At least in 
my reading of Asad, orthodoxy is not a given posi-
tion, but a relationship of power where one side 
in a debate is able to establish its way of relat-
ing to God as the correct, accepted and authori-
tative way. Connecting Asad’s insight with that of 
B, ortho doxy is the currently victorious version of 
one aspect or another of humans’ schizophrenic 
inability to understand the unity of contrary quali-
ties in God.
B’s call to consider both mercy as well as pun-
ishment, and – implicitly – both love as well as fear 
stands in the context of such struggles. His vision 
is not encompassing either: he clearly leans to-
wards mercy and love rather than punishment and 
fear. He also clearly positions himself in societal 
struggles by identifying himself as a leftist and a 
believer with his own ideas about faith. Others 
who disagree with his views might call him a her-
etic.
Poetry, secularity, heresy
B is also a poet. In spring 2017, his first collection 
of colloquial poems was published by a public sec-
tor press. He told me that his collection fell victim 
to what he saw as narrow-minded fearfulness of 
the societal mainstream. Before publication, the 
collection passed an editorial board which recom-
mended it for publication, with two reservations. 
The first was that it was very subjective in tone 
(which B happily admitted). The second was that 
some poems contained »insults on the Islamic re-
ligion.«. He was asked to either revise or remove 
those poems, and he decided to remove them from 
the collection.
Among the poems that were removed was one 
that opened with the line هتلخو  يبلقب  ترسأ  يتلا  ناحبس  اي 
قاتشم Ya subhan allati asrat bi-qalbi w-khallituh 
mushtaq. »Exalted is she who took my heart and 
made it longing.«
The verse contains a direct intertextual ref-
erence to the widely cited Qur’anic verse (Surat 
al-Isra’, 17,1) about Prophet Muhammad’s night-
time journey to Jerusalem and heaven that begins 
Subhan alladhi asra bi-‘abdihi laylan min al-masjidi 
l-harami ila l-masjidi l-aqsa … »Exalted is He who 
took His servant by night from the Sacred Mosque 
(in Mecca) to the Remote Mosque (in Jerusalem)…« 
It also uses the female gender together with the 
word subhan reserved for God, and that in a love 
poem. This was unacceptable for the editors. Addi-
tionally to poems with provocative religious refer-
ences, B also had to remove poems that addressed 
the revolutionary events from 2011 to 2013. The 
collection was originally titled Memoirs of a Re-
tired Prophet, but the publishing editor crossed out 
»prophet« and replaced it with »saint«, using the 
word qiddis that is reserved for Christian saints, 
thus avoiding any association with Islam. Eventu-
ally, the collection was published with an entirely 
different title that had no religious reference.
B told me about the fate of his collection when 
we met in a coffee house in downtown Alexandria 
in February 2017. He complained about what he 
described as the sensitivity of people, »including 
people who in practice are not religious«, towards 
discussing religious matters in ways that depart 
from the musallamat (accepted, taken-for-granted 
axioms): 
They fear such different thinking about faith 
and religion (din) more than outright atheism. 
Atheism is something outside the framework 
and can be left on its own; different thinking is 
more dangerous. 
B actively cultivates thinking and speaking 
against the grain of religious, political and soci-
etal musallamat, and considers the increase in such 
speech one of the few successes of the defeated rev-
olution of 2011 (in which he actively participated). 
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I translate speaking against the grain of author-
ised musallamat within a tradition as heresy (Ara-
bic zandaqa).15 In my reading, B’s manuscript was 
a potentially heretic and on occasions politically 
radical work that could have offended important 
sensibilities about both God and the state. But 
after it was censored by the editorial board, B’s 
published collection became something quite dif-
ferent: it now avoids addressing God directly and 
relegates religion to a position of indirect, limited 
relevance.
The published version fits strikingly well into 
a theory of the secular that has been developed 
by Khaled Furani (2012) and Michael Allan (2016) 
in regard to contemporary Arabic literature. The 
secular, they argue, is not just about people being 
more or less religious, but rather about the crea-
tion of autonomous fields and forms of language 
that relegate religion to the position of a separate 
field. Their work is inspired by the work of Ta-
lal Asad (2003) and others (e.g. Asad et al. 2009, 
Agrama 2012) who argue that »the secular« is pri-
marily about religion becoming problematised and 
compartmentalised as a subject of the sovereign 
state, and religious lives therefore policed and 
disciplined as part of secular governmentality. Es-
pecially in regard to the establishment of auton-
omous fields (such as literature) and their sepa-
ration from »religion«, this theory works well for 
the published volume. But what about the original 
manuscript? The editors did not censor it in order 
to keep religion in its right place, but because it 
related to God, His word and His prophets in a way 
15 My field notes do not reveal whether or not I discussed 
the term »heresy« with him explicitly, but he approved the 
draft of this chapter that I sent to him in spring 2018.
that is seen as wrong and threatening by a vast so-
cietal mainstream in Egypt. Publishing such work 
might cause legal and other trouble not only for 
the author but also for the editors.
While B is a declared political secularist, his 
poetry and many of the views he expressed point 
at another dimension that also has something to 
do with secularity but in Egypt is more often ad-
dressed in relation to faith – that is, correct faith.
Supporters of Islamist movements often propose 
a theory of secularism that is explicitly related to 
faith and the authority God ought to have over 
the affairs of the faithful. Posters distributed by 
the Salafi movement in Alexandria in spring 2011 
declared »The separation of religion and politics 
is the shortest path to unbelief« and »God alone 
is the Lawmaker.« (Figure 6). This was at a time 
when some secularist supporters of the revolution 
were (unsuccessfully) challenging the second arti-
cle of the Egyptian constitution which states that 
Islamic Shari‘a is the main source of positive law.
Three years later, in spring 2014, after the rev-
olution had given way to a military-led counter- 
revolution supported by secularists and Salafis 
alike, I had a similar discussion with H, a poet, 
school teacher and a former member of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood in his forties, who at that time 
was enthusiastically protesting against what 
he saw as a military coup against Egypt’s legiti-
mate president. H argued to me that the reason 
why leftist and liberal revolutionaries would not 
join the movement against the military coup was 
a matter of faith. In Egypt, he explained, eman-
cipatory (taharruri) ideas have been united with 
Islamic faith, which gives them an enormous force 
of determination. As a Muslim he knows that his 
existence is eternal, proceeding in three stages: 
dunya (this world), barzakh (an in-between state 
after death and before resurrection) and akhira 
(the afterworld). This ground of faith, H argued, 
gave the protesters the willingness to die as mar-
tyrs, which meant that they and seventy persons 
of their family will go directly to paradise. »If I 
get caught by a bullet, it is just one hit and I pass 
to the next world«, H told me; and he went on to 
argue that the leftists and liberals have a weaker 
ground of faith, which is why they cling harder to 
this-worldly life and come up with ideological dif-
ferences with the Muslim Brotherhood as a pretext 
for their lack of courage.
H’s claim does not account for the many pro-
ponents of a separation of religion and politics, 
among them B, who do have a strong relation of 
faith with God. It is also unfair towards the cour-
age and strength that followers of other than Isla-
mist movements in Egypt showed during the revo-
lutionary uprising that began in 2011. And yet it is 
not entirely mistaken, insofar that it points at the 
need to understand secularism as a reconfigura-
tion of the power relation between humans and God 
Figure 6: »God alone is the Lawmaker.« Poster on the wall 
of a mosque in Alexandria, October 2011. 
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– a reconfiguration that concerns both this world as 
well as the invisible realm and the hereafter.
In what was sadly her last book, Saba Mahmood 
(2016) develops Asad’s theory of secularism further 
to think systematically about both the governmen-
tal power of secularism, as well as its groundings 
in relations of human and divine power, or what she 
calls »secularity – the shared set of background as-
sumptions, attitudes, and dispositions that imbue 
secular society and subjectivity«. (Mahmood 2016, 
181). In that move, the power relation between 
humans and God becomes an explicit issue, and 
much of the vagueness of preceding theorisations 
about the secular is overcome. In her final chap-
ter, Mahmood takes up the controversy regarding 
Youssef Ziedan’s bestselling novel Azazeel (2012). 
In Mahmood’s reading, the novel not only depicts 
Jesus as human (which would be entirely in line 
with Muslim narratives), but effectively also God 
and religion as human creation: We can perhaps at 
this point begin to 
get a sense of the different meanings of the 
term humanity in Christological debates and in 
Azazeel: in the former, the humanity of Jesus is 
a medium for God’s Word, whereas in the lat-
ter, the humanity of Jesus is a symbol of man’s 
capacity to create truth and meaning. The sec-
ond view wrests power from God and locates 
it in man. This secular-humanist conception of 
religion offends Bishoy (as it would Muslims of 
similar sensibility) because it fundamentally re-
verses the epistemological basis of religion: it is 
not God who creates us, but we who create him. 
(Mahmood 2016, 204, my emphases)
This is a helpful point, even if somewhat too bi-
nary. Mahmood argues that there are two 
incommensurable understandings of religion: 
one in which humanity itself provides the values 
and models of human flourishing against which 
the contributions of religious tradition are to be 
measured and judged; and another wherein hu-
man existence must be molded in accord with 
the dictates of a transcendent god (Mahmood 
2016, 182). 
I hope to add that there are not only two but 
many understandings of the human–God relation-
ship, which may or may not appear partly or fully 
incommensurable. If we stick to a binary model, 
we end up equating secularity with H’s critical 
view of secularists as people who lack faith in life 
after death. After all, the claim that humans cre-
ate God is substantially an atheist one, although 
Mahmood for some reason abstains from making 
that point. I would agree with H that some secu-
larism (or secularity, to follow Mahmood) indeed 
is a cover for having faith in humans instead of 
God – but only some. I disagree with his claim that 
this is generally true of secularists or secularism. 
It is definitely not true of B’s secularism. It is also 
not true of the secularism of the Egyptian state. 
Following the lead offered by H and Mahmood, I 
therefore argue that a focus on human and divine 
power invites an analysis of various secularities, 
rather than one.
The question is not simply an either/or of divine 
or human power. We need to look at different con-
figurations of the relationship. The secularist de-
mand that religion ought to be a private matter im-
plies reconfiguring triadic relations where human 
communities always have God as a third, constitu-
ent party, towards binary relations where individ-
ual humans may entertain a constituent relation 
with God, but interaction among humans is not al-
ways mediated by God as a third party. Sometimes 
this is a cover for an atheist call for a disempower-
ment of God that cannot be voiced openly in Egypt 
except in protected societal niches. But more often, 
people who demand faith to be an intimate rather 
than societal relationship do entertain a relation 
of faith with the One God, and do wish to maintain 
some triadic relations but maybe not others.
In the triadic relations, not only does God have 
power over how humans interact, but also humans 
have power over the ways in which each other re-
late to God. The possibility of enforcing certain 
ways to relate to God rather than others gives 
religious traditions their recognisable continuity, 
much in line with Asad’s (1986) understanding of 
orthodoxy. And yet secular regimes also enforce 
or at least encourage some triadic relations of 
power rather than others (for example, they quite 
systematically favour theologies with apolitical or 
loyalist tendencies against politically oppositional 
ones). The preference for strong triadic, weak tri-
adic or binary relations between humans and God 
is thus not just a formal question; it is about what 
God wants, and what humans want to realise with 
His aid.
The historical emergence of secularism in many 
places around the world has been directed not so 
much against public religion as such (if there is 
such a thing) and rather against specific moral val-
ues and relations of power embodied and author-
ised by the orthodoxies of respective religious tra-
ditions – such as the alliance of the church and the 
crown in defence of established class hierarchies 
that were being challenged by socialist move-
ments in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-cen-
tury Europe (e.g. Jokinen 1906). Today, left-wing 
proponents of privatised faith in the Middle East 
or Western Europe may object against God being 
involved in gender relations in favour of men and 
heteronormative sexuality. But they may entirely 
agree when communities under God are involved 
in assisting refugees, homeless and hungry people, 
and others in need. More right-wing proponents of 
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privatised faith may object against religious polit-
ical movements that challenge the nationalist and 
militarist foundations of the state they identify 
with, but they will enthusiastically call upon God 
to support and unite the nation in wars against its 
enemies. And it is often the case that proponents 
of privatised faith articulate both left- and right-
wing visions in combination. Secularisms share 
the same schizophrenia that according to B marks 
human faith in God.
Privatisation of the human–God relationship is 
a controversial stance in Egypt where not only Is-
lamist movements but also the wider conservative 
societal mainstream (including many government 
functionaries who execute secular policies) are 
committed to God’s role as the guarantor of mor-
al and societal bonds between humans. Removing 
the communal, societally constitutive role of faith 
in God means from the point of view of conserva-
tive Egyptians a moral chaos where children will 
not know their fathers, trust among humans has no 
foundation, debauchery and injustice prevail, and 
the path to Paradise is blocked. This is why pub-
licly identifying as »secularist« (‘almani) invites 
the accusation of actually being an atheist and an 
unbeliever, or at least a morally depraved person. 
Again, the accusation is unfair but not entirely 
misplaced: the privatisation of the human–God 
relationship opens the door to a wide variety of 
unauthorised ways of relating to God, and among 
them is the possibility of a godless life.
But not every secular reconfiguration of the 
power relation between humans and God consti-
tutes such a threat. There are less radical recon-
figurations of the triadic relations between God 
and humans that are widely accepted, even con-
sensual in Egypt. The influential Egyptian social 
theorist Abdelwahhab El-Messiri (2002) distin-
guishes between »partial« and »comprehensive« 
secularism or secularity.16 Partial secularism only 
concerns the relation of religion with public life 
and the state. 
Comprehensive secularism involves the sep-
aration of all human, moral, and religious val-
ues not only from the state but from the nature 
and from the life of humans in its private and 
public dimensions alike, whereby sacredness is 
removed from the world which transforms into 
a useful material that can be employed by the 
strongest (El-Messiri 2002, 16).
El-Messiri is evidently not a supporter of com-
prehensive secularism, but he considers partial 
secularism inevitable and useful in contemporary 
society. Partial secularism is a softer reconfigu-
16 Arabic ‘almaniya can be translated in English as both 
»secularism« and »secularity«.
ration of the human–God relationship, whereby 
God not only maintains individual relations with 
humans but also holds some triadic power in mat-
ters of moral or identitarian importance, and yet 
may not intervene in many other matters of the 
common good. Unsurprisingly, El-Messiri’s theory 
resonates well with common sense in Egypt, and 
his work has been inspirational for the so-called 
post-Islamist current in Egypt (Kinitz 2016, 160–
187).
Importantly, El-Messiri’s partial secularism is 
also largely congruent with the actually existing 
secular power (in Asad’s sense) of the Egyptian 
state, which has to reckon with divine certainties 
and cannot manipulate them at will, but possess-
es power to demarcate and govern them, and can 
selectively translate God’s commands into secu-
lar positive law. Such governmental secularism, 
as it may be called, is prevalent and established 
in Egypt, and rarely challenges the power of God 
as a constituent of moral and societal bonds. In-
stead, it is a useful means to turn Him into an ally 
of state power very much along the lines analysed 
by Asad (2003), Agrama (2012) and others. Sub-
ordinating religion to politics on a governmental 
level means not confronting head-on key sensibil-
ities of the human– God relationship that the im-
position of state power over that relationship may 
infringe upon. But it also generates conflicts and 
legiti mises state violence. It shapes rather than 
overcomes existing sectarian conflicts (Mahmood 
2016), and it reinforces the supremacy of the secu-
rity state over the lives and deaths of its citizens.17
What may be called life-worldly secularism, in 
contrast, is closer to Mahmood’s notion of secu-
larity but in a non-binary way: it entails various 
17 I am grateful to Mayanthi Fernando for pointing out 
that this can be understood as a shift of sovereignty from 
God to humans and/or the nation state. I agree that some 
secularisms involve such a shift of sovereignty. However, 
at least in the Egyptian context, state sovereignty does not 
appear to replace divine sovereignty, and Arabic speakers 
may not use the same word for the two sovereignties. Old-
er Middle Eastern traditions and vocabularies of statecraft 
provide a clue: they involve a soft division between the di-
vinely grounded competence of shari‘a and justice that was 
exercised by sometimes remarkably independent experts, 
and the political power (siyasa) of the court (diwan) that 
had partly different sources of authority and commanded 
greater means of violence. The Arabic word of human gov-
ernmental leadership and sovereignty, siyada, is derived 
from sayyid, »master, lord«, which in the historical record of 
classical Arabic dictionaries is explained as a human attrib-
ute endowed by God (see, e.g., Almaany online dictionary’s 
entry on siyada, especially point 14, citing the classical dic-
tionary Lisan al-‘Arab: https://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/ar-
ar/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9/). Follow-
ers of a twentieth-century radical Islamist theory of divine 
political sovereignty speak not of siyada but of hakimiya, de-
rived from the verb hakama that can mean both »to judge« 
and »to rule« and thus unites the historical competencies of 
shari‘a-based judgement and siyasa-based rule.
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reconfigurations of the intimate relations of disci-
pline, sustenance and exploration that come to ap-
pear as negotiable to some degree. This may – but 
does not have to – come along with one formulation 
or another of a secular concept of humanity. Such 
life-worldly secularism is heretical and threaten-
ing in Egypt except in a few urban milieus, in the 
sense that it involves unauthorised ways to relate 
to God that challenge authorised, societally con-
stitutive ways to relate to Him, and empower hu-
mans to individually renegotiate their position vis-
à-vis God and, by extension, with other humans. 
This includes not only the few assertive atheists 
and the somewhat more numerous (but also few) 
irreligious people in Egypt. B’s poetry and the 
way he relates to God and the religiosity of people 
around him are a case in point of a pious version of 
life-worldly secularism.
Where there is a struggle for authorisation and 
authorised orthodoxy, there is also unauthorised 
heresy. In other words, heresy is an unauthorised 
relationship with God. But whether having a pri-
vatised relationship with the monotheist God (or 
even none at all) is heretical or not depends on the 
context. In most societal contexts in Western Eu-
rope, a privatised human–God relationship is he-
gemonic and orthodox, and triadic relations are 
uncontested only in certain social fields (such as 
charity and welfare). In many contexts in the Mid-
dle East, a privatised relationship with God can be 
heretic and experienced as a societal threat. This 
is also why anthropological analyses about Muslim 
lives and divine and secular powers that are very 
fitting and true about one place may not be helpful 
to understand other places.
About a good life
Living a life with the God of the Qur’an is crucially 
about living a good life under the guidance and 
sustenance of an ultimately benevolent Creator. 
Goodness, righteousness, ultimate justice, mercy 
and reward are central to monotheist faith. Good-
ness in this world is linked with even better re-
wards in the afterlife. And moral goodness is not 
separate from material goods. Livelihood, well-be-
ing, health, wealth and offspring are among God’s 
generous gifts or blessings (baraka, see Mittermai-
er 2014) to humans.
I am unable, and perhaps unwilling, to provide 
an account of what exactly such a good life entails, 
because such an account would already be caught 
in the schizophrenic inability to perceive the mul-
titude of powers, goods and lives in combination. 
Followers of different faiths and also of different 
interpretations of the same faith often have dif-
ferent ideas about what counts as good and right. 
Good in what way? By whose standards? In this life 
or in the Hereafter? Life in what sense? Is good 
life potentially abundant like baraka, or is our pos-
sible share in rizq and moral goodness ultimately 
limited by the ecological foundations of our and 
other species’ existence? What if the major pro-
blem humans face in 21st century is not good life 
but survival? 
The difficulty of providing a conclusive account 
also seems to be a key characteristic of the dif-
ferent senses of good life I have touched upon in 
this essay: they involve a striving for or at least a 
recognition of ultimate truth, unity, a final arbiter 
over right and wrong, one who knows for sure. At 
the same time, they have space for one way or an-
other, various degrees of intensity, discipline, sus-
tenance, exploration and more – and they involve 
dimensions that are difficult to combine from a hu-
man point of view. The power of God seems there-
fore to lie crucially in His encompassing capacity; 
that is, His ability to unite contrary capacities and 
qualities and thereby to create productive ten-
sions and contradictions that structure and guide 
human lives by promising clear guidance, certain 
trust and ultimate hope.
It is possible, even attractive, to claim an en-
compassing social scientific theory of Islam (as has 
been done by Asad 1986, Ahmed 2016 and others). 
However, I lean more towards a recognition of the 
schizophrenic limits of social scientific knowledge. 
God invites us to follow lines of guidance, lines of 
sustenance, lines of experience and exploration, 
lines of politics and others. What we learn from 
following some of these lines may not be, and may 
not have to be, resolvable with what we learn from 
others.
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Alice Elliot (2018) and has been shaped in conver-
sation with them and contributors to the thematic 
section. Additionally to the many people in Egypt 
who have inspired my thinking and who are either 
not mentioned directly or who appear in this ar-
ticle without their real names, I am indebted for 
the collegial feedback, comments and ideas that 
I have received from Montaser Abdel Mawgoud, 
Paola Abenante, André Chappatte, Amin El-Yousfi, 
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Michael Feener, Mayanthi Fernando, Adeel Sartori 
Khan, Dietrich Jung, Amira Mittermaier, Arman-
do Salvatore, Emanuel Schaeublin, Mukhtar Saad 
Shehata, Christian Suhr, Pooyan Tamimi Arab, 
Fabio Vicini and all those who participated in dis-
cussions at the above-mentioned presentations. 
Research for this paper has been made possible 
by my long-term employment at Leibniz-Zentrum 
Moderner Orient (ZMO).
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